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A Europe in the World? – Twenty Years After 1989
DIPESH CHAKRABARTY
1I cannot claim to be European in any 
personal sense. I was born and raised 
and educated in India where I obtained 
my fi rst few degrees. I did my doctoral 
studies in history in Australia where I 
also taught for ten years before moving 
to the United Stated where I have been 
since 1995. Yet I have something inves-
ted in Europe and in what the fall of the 
wall in 1989 symbolized, an investment 
both personal and impersonal, in that it 
is an investment I have as an interested 
student of globalization, in particular of 
the rise of China and India in the con-
temporary world.
Let me begin by speaking a little of 
my own personal “envy” – if I may put 
it so – of the historical luck of the Ger-
mans. I belong to a particular langua-
ge-group, the Bengali-speakers of the 
world. We were divided – or divided our-
selves – in 1947 when British India was 
made into the two new states of India 
and Pakistan. The majority of Bengalis 
are Muslims, and a substantial minority 
Hindus. I am a Hindu. On partition, most 
Muslim Bengalis chose to stay in what 
became then East Pakistan and, in 1971, 
Bangladesh. Hindu Bengalis, on the 
other hand, formed the majority in the 
province of West Bengal in India. The 
division cost us both in material terms 
and in terms of real losses in the realm of 
culture – loss of linguistic, musical, and 
religious diversity and overlaps. But the 
division has proved to be much deeper 
and more complete than in the case of 
Germany.  The walls we erected in our 
own minds will not crumble so easily as 
the Berlin wall. Of course, unifi cation in 
Germany has had its own complications. 
The little that I have read on the cultural 
politics of German unifi cation has aler-
ted me to continuing tensions as people 
from the former East get portrayed as ha-
1 Based on a talk given at a History Forum held at the 
German Historical Museum, Berlin in April 2009. The 
piece was fi rst published in Economic and Political 
Weekly (Mumbai), 7 November 2009.
ving been burdened by their “backward” 
past – their Ostalgie – while Germany, 
thanks to its western side, wants to forge 
ahead towards a European future. Still, 
as someone born to a partitioned land, I 
have always thought of 1989 as embody-
ing a possibility for all divided peoples 
of the world: the hope of unifi cation.
But my larger investment in 1989 
can be connected back to what Pro-
fessor Timothy Garton Ash said in his 
opening remarks to a German History 
Forum held in Berlin in April 2009. He 
expressed the hope that post-reunifi ca-
tion Germany, instead of becoming a 
“normal” nation-state, would actually 
provide leadership for the development 
of a European foreign policy that was 
called forth, in Professor Ash’s judg-
ment, by a world in which Europeans, 
or even the West generally, no longer 
called the shots. In looking for a more 
European rather than inward-looking 
Germany, Professor Ash indirectly re-
called the dilemma that Thomas Mann 
famously voiced in 1945: Do we want 
a Germanized Europe or a European 
Germany?  It is, of course, well known 
that a European Germany was looked 
upon by many in the Federal Republic 
an effective anti-dote to the recently 
witnessed excesses of the ugly sides of 
nationalism. 
Professor Ash was, of course, not 
simply repeating Mann; he had a very 
specifi c objective. Europe, suggested 
Ash, needed a unifi ed foreign policy 
precisely because of developments that 
would have been diffi cult to foresee 
in the years when Mann spelt out the 
choice that he thought the post-war Re-
public faced. Professor Ash was clearly 
referring to the contemporary global 
roles of countries such as China and In-
dia (or Brazil and Russia, to stay with 
the acronym BRIC).  It was in that con-
text that he wanted Germany to act like 
a leader of the countries that make up 
Europe today. Indeed, Ash’s question 
and Mann’s choice may thus be posed 
thus for the Europe of our times: What 
should Europe be in the twenty-fi rst cen-
tury - a super-state with a nation-state 
like function, a Europe with a unifi ed 
foreign policy, or a partner in an emer-
ging system of interactive global gover-
nance and regulation? Not just a Europe 
dealing effectively with the world but a 
Europe that actually is in that world.  
What do I mean by Europe-in-the-
world? Let me explain this as a student 
of imperial and colonial domination. 
There is no question that Europe and Eu-
ropeans once dominated this planet. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, eighty 
per cent of the surface of the earth was 
under the rule of one European power 
or another.  Since 1945, however, we 
have seen a retreat of the colonial great 
powers of Europe and the rise of super-
powers like the United States and once 
the Soviet Union as well. China and In-
dia today aspire to similar super-power 
status. China has already achieved a lot 
more of it than India. A super-power 
that dominates us surely dominates us 
economically, militarily, and technolo-
gically. It also undoubtedly infl uences 
our imagination – the twentieth centu-
ry, which became the American centu-
ry, cannot be imagined, for example, 
without the global dominance of Hol-
lywood or American television. Yet a 
distinction remains to be made between 
European colonial domination of others 
and the sheer economic, military, and 
cultural weight of a super-power. The 
distinction is this: when European pow-
ers became imperial-colonial “lords of 
the humankind” from the period of the 
Renaissance to that of the Enlighten-
ment and into the nineteenth century, 
they also gave their victims the terms 
and categories of thought with which 
to critique and challenge European do-
mination. Two such great “weapons of 
criticism” forged in the European work-
shop of the nineteenth century – but 
with their intellectual genealogies stret-
ching further back into history – were 
Marxism and Liberalism, both wielded 
with great effect by many decolonizing 
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nations and thinkers who criticized Eu-
ropean domination. No dominant power 
is ever totally benign. Today, I ask my 
Indian or Chinese friends this question: 
“I understand, and even support, your 
desires to be super-powers. But when 
you come to dominate the world truly 
and effectively, what terms of criticism 
will you provide to your victims so that 
they can criticize your domination?” 
Surely, technology, economics, and the 
media alone cannot produce such terms. 
In other words, European colonial 
domination was different from super-
power domination in that it had a civili-
zational  aspect – I do not refer to the ci-
vilizing aspect, I draw a distinction here, 
for the “civilizing mission” was often 
simply an excuse for domination. I reject 
ideas about civilizational hierarchies but 
do fi nd the idea of civilization, a shared 
human civilization on the planet, an ex-
tremely important part of our heritage. 
It was through this aspect that European 
powers invited criticisms of themselves. 
Anti-colonial thinkers often recognized 
this debt to Europe. I could have drawn 
on Frantz Fanon, the great ant-colonial 
voice of the twentieth century, to make 
my point here. But let me stay with my 
Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore to ex-
plicate what I am saying. 
Europeans brought the word “civi-
lization” to India. As Tagore remarked 
in 1941, the last year of his life, the word 
“civilization” that had been translated 
into Bengali (and Hindi and many other 
Indian languages) as sabhyata actually 
had no equivalent in “our languages.”2 
There is no doubt that people such as 
Tagore carried on through their lives 
a complex conversation with the West 
in which there was never a question of 
a complete rejection of European tra-
ditions that had played such a central 
role in their own making. In his 1941 
essay on “Crisis in Civilization,” Ta-
gore – faced with the barbarism of the 
war – struck a despondent note on the 
question of European civilization: “I 
had at one time believed that the springs 
of civilization would issue out of the 
heart of Europe. But today when I am 
2 Rabindranath Tagore, “sabhyatar shankat” [“The Crisis 
of Civilization”] in Rabindrarachanabali [The Collected 
Works of Rabindranath], Centenary Edition (Calcutta: 
Government of West Bengal, 1961), vol. 13, p. 407. There 
is an English version of the essay: “Crisis in Civilization,” 
in The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Ed. Sisir 
Kumar Das, vol. 3 (Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1999).
about to the quit the world that faith has 
gone bankrupt altogether.” Yet it was 
Europe’s capacity to furnish itself with 
tools for self-criticism and, therefore, 
for self-improvement that impressed 
Tagore in the end. Of the Spanish-Eng-
lish relations, for example, he would 
say: “We have … witnessed from this 
distance how actively the British states-
men acquiesced in the destruction of 
the Spanish Republic. On the other 
hand, we also noted with admiration 
how a band of valiant Englishmen laid 
down their lives for Spain.”3 The gene-
ral principle involved here was spelt out 
as a part of a lecture he gave in 1923 
and then reproduced verbatim in a letter 
written to an Oxford-based academic 
in 1934: “We have seen Europe cruelly 
unscrupulous in its politics and com-
merce, widely spreading slavery over 
the face of the earth in various names 
and forms. And yet, in this very same 
Europe, protest is always alive against 
its own inequities.”4 
Decolonization, the rise of the US, 
Soviet Union, and now of China, In-
dia, or Brazil have, of course, called a 
halt to the Europe that was built on fi ve 
hundred years of domination of other 
peoples. But the Europe that lives on 
is the Europe that has provided us with 
the critical political vocabulary with 
which inequality, oppression, injustice, 
and the violation of human rights can 
be criticized. The vocabulary is now 
everybody’s. And in that sense, Europe 
is part of everybody’s heritage.
From this perspective, then, Thomas 
Mann’s or even Professor Ash’s questi-
on becomes larger: how, indeed, would 
Europe, as it is newly constituted, play 
its part in the world to come? 
First of all, the European Union is a 
great administrative model for many re-
gions of the world, surely the one I come 
from – South Asia. There is an organi-
zation that exists to help the nations of 
South Asian to come together in coope-
rative endeavors – SAARC, South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation. 
But it is hardly anything like the Union 
in Europe. Yet, imagine, how much ea-
sier problems such as “Kashmir” would 
3 Tagore. “Crisis,” in English Writings, pp. 724-725.
4 The lines occur in a 1923 lecture entitled “The Way 
to Unity” and are repeated in a 1934 letter written in 
response to a letter from Professor Gilbert Murray, 
published together under the title “East and West” in 
English Writings, pp. 349, 462.
have been if this region in effect were 
one common market with free move-
ment of labor and capital. 
Secondly, there need to be changes 
within Europe. We need a more inclu-
sive Europe, not just with regard to out-
siders but with regard to the population 
within the territory called Europe. The 
silent identifi cation of Western Europe 
with “modernity” and the rest of Eu-
rope with “backwardness” will have to 
be combated. This is, of course, an old 
habit of thought. There is a long traditi-
on, for instance, of Germans seeing the 
Slavs or Russians as Asiatic, meaning 
“backward.” You only have to travel 
in Eastern Europe to know that there 
is this kind of European Orientalism 
at work within the continent, an Orien-
talism that Edward Said did not study, 
but one that acts more or less similarly 
to the phenomenon he made famous. A 
version of this, as many academics have 
pointed out, still exists in post-unifi ca-
tion Germany as well. 
An inclusive Europe, however, must 
mean something opposed to the idea of 
a Fortress Europe. I am not expressing 
a preference here for porous borders or 
the absence of immigration policies. 
That simply would be unpractical and 
irresponsible. What I have in mind is 
a fact and a recommendation that fol-
lows from this particular fact. The fact 
is that the world in the next thirty go-
ing to see more people (many of them 
in India and China), more failed states, 
and more political, economic and cli-
mate refugees and more migration and 
movement of peoples. The politics of 
cross-cultural understanding requires 
that we the middle and professional 
classes everywhere embody a degree 
of cultural plurality, so that distinctions 
between cultural borders are somewhat 
blurred and every nation acknowledges 
the diversity that constitutes it. This 
is what will promote new creativities 
in the arts and the sciences, and new 
imaginations of society. Without the 
“chattering classes” embracing a sense 
of cultural plurality, there cannot deve-
lop the refl exive attitude with which to 
renew our shared European legacy. The 
French thinker Etienne Balibar calls 
for a global recognition of the “post-
colonial condition.” Balibar thinks of 
the contemporary world as postcolonial 
in two senses: (a) we live in times that 
come after the period of decolonization 
of the world from European empires, 
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and (b) we live alongside peoples whose 
ancestors have suffered in some form or 
others European domination. “Fortress 
Europe” today for me does not necessa-
rily mean a Europe that has its borders 
closed. Sheer demographics will force 
developed countries and regions to have 
an immigration policy. The debate is 
more about the impact of such immig-
ration. Do we want immigrants to sim-
ply fi t into “our” traditions and become 
“us” with different skin-colors? Or do 
we want them to be educated enough 
not only to internalize what we con-
sider the best of our values but also to 
use their sense of historical difference 
to call them into question and thus help 
us renew them? It is the latter attitude 
that defi nes for me the opposite of the 
Fortress Europe mentality today.
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